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IS BReNtaNO’S MethOD a UNIFyINg eleMeNt  
OF the BReNtaNO SChOOl?
among historians of philosophy it is often taken for granted that the «Brentano school» was 
one of the influential philosophical movements at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
of the twentieth century – but Brentano’s own contributions are often eclipsed by that of his 
direct students. This invites to reflect on the nature of and the unity within the school. Since 
Brentano’s conception of a rigorous, scientific philosophy had a strong impact on his students, 
it has been argued that this conception constitutes a unifying element in an otherwise hetero-
geneous group. The scope of this article is to shed light on this thesis and to show its limits. I 
argue for a differentiated view: the Brentano school is best seen not as a compact movement, 
but as a heterogeneous group of scholars who approached, in a given historical and geographi-
cal period, similar topics in very similar ways. 
Keywords: Franz Brentano, Brentano-school, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, Edmund Hus-
serl, Alexius Meinong, Descriptive Pscychology
Brentano had a somewhat peculiar position in the history of philosophy. At the time 
when he started to publish, the traditions of German idealism and system philosophy 
had come to an end and made way for a new, more scientifically orientated conception 
of philosophy. While Brentano saw himself as an innovator who actively participated 
in the attempt to shape a new paradigm of research in philosophy and psychology, he 
is nowadays often only mentioned for having introduced the notion of intentionality 
and for the long and impressive list of students who he has taught – but his own con-
tributions to philosophy are hardly discussed; his students seem to have had a much 
stronger impact on the development of philosophy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. This raises questions concerning the nature and impact of Bren-
tano’s school. In particular, we might ask whether there is a unity among the direct 
students of Brentano that would allow us to speak of a school or a movement in a 
narrow sense, i.e. a homogeneous group of scholars who jointly elaborate a shared 
philosophical perspective. This question seems relevant, as the «Brentano school» has 
gained increasing attention over the last decades. 
Since it was proposed recently that Brentano’s conception of a rigorous, scientific 
philosophy and his metaphilosophical views are unifying elements of the Brentano 
school, I will pay particular attention to the role Brentano’s views on the true method 
of philosophy have had for his impact on students and for the formation of the school. 
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In the first part of the present article, I will reconstruct the role Brentano’s methodo-
logical maxim has had for his philosophical self-understanding. Then I will recon-
struct the impact of this maxim on his direct students. In the final part I will focus on 
the very idea of a «Brentano school». In particular, I will discuss the philosophical 
unity of the school and mention some contingent historical circumstances that have 
shaped its development.
1. Brentano’s views concerning philosophical method and their role within a 
larger picture
Throughout his lifetime, Brentano continued to develop and refine his views. As he 
approached philosophy in a very systematic manner and always kept the bigger pic-
ture in mind, minor changes in single parts of his philosophical views often brought 
about modifications or adjustments in his overall position1. there are, however, sev-
eral themes in Brentano’s thought that show remarkable continuity, such as his views 
concerning the correct method of philosophy. He formulated the maxim that philoso-
phy should adopt the strict and rigorous method of the natural sciences already early 
in his career, at his Habilitations-defense in 18662, and found various occasions to 
reaffirm and elaborate his conception in publications and lectures later in his life. 
Brentano’s views on the subject remain substantially unaltered, though we can notice 
a slight change regarding their dialectical function. In the early formulations of the the-
sis, its negative impact seems to be dominant. At his Habilitations-defense, for example, 
Brentano merely states the thesis, but does not spell out in detail how a rigorous and 
scientific method could be applied in philosophy. It seems, thus, that he was mainly 
interested in stating how philosophy should not be done: Brentano’s maxim arguably 
served to demarcate his own position from the dominant traditions of german ideal-
ism and system philosophy. In particular, his fourth Habilitations-thesis was part of a 
strategy to take distance from Schellingianism3, which at the time had a secure standing 
at the University of Würzburg, where the Habilitation took place4. Brentano, thus, did 
1 This does not imply that Brentano intended to present a system, as was suggested in the recent 
literature (cf. U. Kriegel, Brentano’s Philosophical Program, in id. [ed.] The Routledge Handbook 
of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, Routledge, London and New York 2017, pp. 21-32), an 
assessment that brings Brentano dangerously close to German system philosophy, which definitely does 
not do justice to the his own understanding of his work. For a more detailed discussion, cf. W. Huemer, 
Was Brentano a Systematic Philosopher? in m. antonelli - t. Binder (eds.) The Philosophy of Franz 
Brentano, Brill, leiden (forthcoming).
2 at the occasion of his Habilitations-defense, which took place on July 14, 1866, Brentano posted 25 
theses in Latin, the fourth of which reads: «Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis 
est [The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences]». The theses are reprin-
ted in F. Brentano, Über die Zukunft der Philosophie, Meiner, Hamburg 1968, pp. 136 ff.
3 This becomes particularly evident when studied in connection with the second thesis, in which Bren-
tano attacks the idea that revelation (Offenbarung) could be a source of knowledge in philosophy – a claim 
that can be read as a direct attack on Schelling.
4 Schelling was professor at the University of Würzburg from 1803-1806. Moreover, Brentano recalls 
that at the time of his Habilitation, the two professors of philosophy at Würzburg, Franz Hoffmann and a 
certain Maier [sic!], were both direct students of Schelling (cf. ibi. p. 106). Hoffmann was a direct student 
both of Schelling and Baader. When Brentano mentions «Maier, der Vater des Nationalökonmen» (ibidem) 
he probably refers to Alois Mayr, father of the economist Georg Mayr, who is the only Mayr (by this or 
any similar spelling) listed at the Verzeichniss der Vorlesungen of the University of Würzburg, faculty of 
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not shy away from attacking a philosophical approach that had been adopted by several 
members of the exam committee. This move was not without risk5, but allowed him 
to depict the mainstream position as outdated and at the same time to present his own 
position – or better: the position he intended to develop in full detail in the years after the 
Habilitation – as an innovative and original alternative. 
philosophy, at the time. Mayr was primarily a mathematician, but also taught courses on philosophy.
5 With his direct and polemic way of defending his philosophical views, Brentano risked offending the 
professors at Würzburg who not only had to judge about his Habilitation, but also were called to decide 
on his academic future only four years later. In fact, when Brentano formally asked to be promoted from 
Privatdozent to außerordentlicher Professor in 1870, his application was welcomed by the faculty in a meet-
ing in July, but a definite decision was delayed to a later moment. In early December 1870, however, Bren-
tano’s application was voted down. There seems to have been a heated discussion, for several professors 
felt the need to express their diverging opinions, and, thus, to support Brentano’s application, in so-called 
Separatvoten, i.e. in statements that were added to the minutes of a faculty meeting and in which individual 
members of the meeting could voice their disagreement with the majority decision. These Separatvoten are 
reprinted in t. freudenBerger, Die Universität Würzburg und das erste vatikanische Konzil: ein Beitrag 
zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Degener, Neustadt a.d. Aisch 1969, pp. 457-464. 
these Separatvoten were successful as they were received by the senate of the University of Würzburg, 
who decided in February 1871 to submit Brentano’s application to the ministry and, thus, made possible 
that Brentano was promoted to außerordentlicher Professor on May 13, 1872. Interestingly enough, Franz 
Hoffmann made the unusual move to draft a Separatvotum, even though he agreed with the majority deci-
sion of the faculty meeting. The way in which he presents his reasons for the view that Brentano should 
not be promoted to außerordentlicher Professor show that the relation between Brentano and Hoffmann 
were not without friction. Apart from criticizing Brentano for the short list of publications (a fact that is 
mentioned, but not considered decisive also by those who drafted a Separatvotum in favor of Brentano) 
Hoffmann calls Brentano «a minor important beginner, who, after having been friendly supported by me, 
treated me ignobly» [noch wenig bedeutenden Anfänger, der von mir auf das freundlichste gefördert worden 
war und sich ignobel gegen mich betragen hatte]» (ibi, p. 460, my translation). hoffmann calls Brentano 
«ungrateful and inconsiderate [undankbar und rücksichtslos]» (ibi, p. 462). At one point he describes him 
as a «talented young scholar, whose development of life and orientation of mind should have guided him 
towards theology. as a professor of Dogmatics or the history of Dogmas or of Patristics at a theologi-
cal faculty he probably could have achieved in short time excellent, maybe even outstanding results. As a 
philosopher one can expect hardly more from him than a scant repristination of medieval scholastics that 
shows mainly Aristotelian influences, brought into a modern shape and adorned with some modern ingredi-
ents [Dr. Brentano ist ein begabter jüngerer Gelehrter, dessen Lebensentwicklung und Geistesrichtung ihn 
auf die Theologie hätte hinweisen sollen. Als Professor der Dogmatik, der Dogmengeschichte, der Patristik 
an einer theologischen Fakultät würde er wahrscheinlich nach einiger Zeit Vorzügliches, vielleicht Aus-
gezeichnetes leisten. Als Philosoph steht kaum etwas Anderes von ihm zu erwarten als eine unzulängliche 
Repristination der vorwiegend unter aristotelischen Einflüssen erwachsenen mittelalterlichen Scholastik, 
in moderne Formen gegossen und mit einigen modernen Zutaten ausgeschmückt]» (ibi, p. 461, my trans-
lation). In a good part of the Separatvotum, Hoffmann spells out how harmful it could be if only a single 
Catholic priest would become philosophy professor at Würzburg. He expresses his fears that illiberal ten-
dencies in the Catholic church – tendencies that have become, in Hoffmann’s view, manifest in the dogma 
of papal infallibility, which had been promulgated in the same year – would threaten academic freedom in 
Würzburg’s philosophical faculty. Ironically, Hoffmann seems to project his aversion against the first Vati-
can council on Brentano. He obviously had not taken notice of the fact that Brentano himself struggled with 
the results of the council and especially with the dogma of papal infallibility, which caused him, as is well 
known, to eventually withdraw from priesthood – and from the position that Hoffmann wanted to deny him. 
Incidentally, also the second direct student of Schelling at the faculty, Alois Mayr, has drafted a Separat- 
votum. Mayr seemed to have had a much more positive opinion of Brentano, though. Not only did he 
welcome Brentano’s promotion to außerordentlicher Professor, he even suggested he should have been 
promoted to full professor, if there was the possibility to do so: cf. ibi, pp. 458 ff.
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When Brentano came back to discuss the method of philosophy later in his life, 
on the other hand, he seemed to have more constructive intentions. His main goal 
was no longer to demarcate his own position from the ones that had dominated the 
philosophical landscape of Germany until the mid-nineteenth century. Rather, the way 
he talked about the correct method of philosophy is directed towards the future devel-
opment of the discipline. This became particularly manifest in two respects. First, in 
several occasions he spells out, in more detail compared to his early statement, how 
a scientific and rigorous method can be applied in philosophy. Brentano, thus, made 
an effort to determine in a clear and explicit manner how research in the young disci-
pline of psychology ought to be conducted6. Second, if we consider Brentano’s cyclic 
model of the history of philosophy, we see that his maxim on method also allowed 
him to mark his own position in the discipline. according to this model, which he had 
developed from 1860 on7 but has presented in print only in 18958, the three periods in 
the history of philosophy – ancient, medieval and modern philosophy – can be sub-
divided into four phases: the first is a phase of ascending development that is marked 
by a «lively and pure theoretical interest»9. the other three are phases of decline: In 
the second phase, the pure theoretical interest and profundity diminish; it is a phase of 
divulgation, the achievements of the first phase are explored and scholars are mainly 
interested in the practical application of the results of the first phase. In this process, 
the new paradigm starts to show its limits, people lose their trust in science. A general 
skeptical attitude gains ground and comes to dominate the third phase, which is the 
second phase of decline. But this leaves unsatisfied, as people have a natural inclina-
tion to strive for knowledge. With «pathologically intensified enthusiasm people start 
once more to construct philosophical dogmas»10, but they do so relying on unnatural 
sources of knowledge, on «ingenious “directly intuitive” powers, mystical intensifica-
tions of the mental life»11: in the fourth phase, skepticism turns into mysticism. With 
this, the development comes to an end and a new cycle can begin – and it will do so 
with a phase of ascending development, which will be made possible by a new shift 
6 Brentano described his method already in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt 1, Meiner, 
Leipzig 1924; Engl. transl. by. A.C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L.L. McAlister, Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, Routledge, London and New York 1995, but his description of the method remained 
still quite general and contained aspects that have never been fully developed neither in Psychology, nor 
in later texts and can, thus, be considered ‘dead ends’ (take, for example, Brentano’s remark on the impor-
tance of «the study of autobiographies for the psychologist» [ibi, p. 29], which, as far as I know, has never 
been taken up by him or any of his students). Brentano did continue to refine and elaborate his method. He 
presented his views mainly in lectures, though, which could be taken to show that he intended to teach the 
method to a younger generation. Some of these lecture notes have been made available in his Descriptive 
Psychology, Engl. transl. by B. Müller, Routledge, London and New York 1995. 
7 «The first time Brentano was struck by this idea, as he later told me, was during his convalescence 
from a serious illness (Easter 1860)» (C. Stumpf, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, Engl. transl. by 
l.l. Mcalister and M. Schättle, in l.l. mcaliSter [ed.], The Philosophy of Brentano, Duckworth, 
london 1976, pp. 10-46, here p. 11).
8 F. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand, Felix Meiner Verlag, 
Leipzig 1926; Engl. transl. by B.M Mezei and B. Smith, The Four Phases of Philosophy and Its Current 
State, in B.m. mezei  - B. SmitH (eds.), The Four Phases of Philosophy, Rodopi, amsterdam - atlanta 
(ga) 1998, pp. 81-111.
9 Ibi, p. 10; engl. transl., pp. 85 ff.
10 Ibi, p. 9; engl. transl., p. 86.
11 Ibidem.
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in paradigm that brings into view phenomena that have been overlooked so far and 
requires a new methodological framework «that is essentially appropriate to nature»12. 
In the light of this model, it seems plausible to suggest that Brentano’s later state-
ments concerning the right method of philosophy do not aim primarily at distin-
guishing himself from other philosophical traditions, but rather at presenting his own 
philosophical position as a contribution to the inauguration of a phase of ascending 
development that could mark the beginning of a new, fourth period in the history of 
philosophy13 – an achievement which, as he states in his 1894 lecture on the Four 
Phases of Philosophy, will be «accomplished by us or by our successors»14.
In addition, the development of a new method for philosophy can have a collat-
eral effect, of which Brentano was definitely aware: A philosopher who succeeds in 
introducing a new methodological framework is not only in a position to substantiate 
the idea that he was able to conduct research in new directions and pay due attention 
to phenomena that others might have overlooked – and, thus, to show that his own 
contribution goes essentially beyond the ‘state of the art’. He can also nourish the 
hope that a new generation of scholars, who see the relevance of this new framework 
and develop an interest in the new fields of study, will be willing to adopt it and, thus, 
elaborate and refine the research project that the philosopher who introduced it in the 
first place might have only sketched in its general traits. The new method might, thus, 
launch a new tradition or school that elevates his contribution from the level of indi-
vidual achievement to that of a collective enterprise. 
In both respects, the negative impulse of demarcation and the positive goal of 
establishing a new methodological framework for philosophical research, Brentano’s 
attempts have proven successful, albeit – especially with regard to the second point – 
on a more modest scale than he might have hoped. He definitely managed to mark the 
differences between his own position and the tradition of German Idealism which, 
in the eyes of many, had already come to a dead end at the time. It is less obvious, 
however, that Brentano has actually achieved what he had hoped for with respect to 
setting up a tradition, a school, or a movement of scholars who would have contin-
ued to conduct research in the theoretical framework he had introduced15. this might 
12 Ibi, p. 8; engl. transl., p. 85.
13 Brentano has expressed his conviction that there is a strong tie between the development of a new 
method and the beginning of a new phase in philosophy already in 1866. In his Habilitations-lecture on 
Schelling, he states that «[t]he great turning points in the developments of a science indisputably come 
along with a change of method» (Brentano, Über die Zukunft der Philosophie, p. 108).
14 Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand, p. 31; engl. transl., p. 
110. The way in which Brentano sets up his model definitely invites for this thought. Balázs Mezei and 
Barry Smith make this inference explicitly and state in a text that accompanies the english translation of 
the lecture, which they have edited, that Brentano was «as representing the first, ascending phase in the 
current cycle of philosophical development» (mezei - SmitH, The Four Phases of Philosophy, p. 42).
15 If we take into consideration the opinions voiced by some of Brentano’s direct students, it is not 
clear, however, whether and to what extent it was Brentano’s intention to found a new school that bears his 
name in the first place. Carl Stumpf, for example, suggests that Brentano was opposed to this very idea. 
In his Reminiscences, he states that «he [i.e., Brentano] was, on principle and with every right, against the 
development of a “school” that swears by his every word» (Stumpf, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 
44). I think that we should take this statement with caution, though. Brentano always upheld the ideal of 
educating his students to become independent thinkers rather than blind followers. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that both Husserl (cf. E. HuSSerl, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, Engl. transl. by L.L. McAlister 
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sound controversial, as Brentano nowadays is often introduced with reference to the 
long and impressive list of students that have studied with him. Moreover, the term 
«Brentano school» is often used to refer to a group of clearly defined philosophers 
who worked on a related set of topics16. There are, of course, good reasons for group-
ing philosophers like Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, 
Christian von Ehrenfels, Kasimir Twardowski, and others under one heading: all of 
them build on central notions of Brentano’s philosophy, most notably on the notion of 
intentionality, and all of them dedicated a good part of their energy to the development 
of a philosophical psychology or, more generally, the study of consciousness. Still, 
I would like to propose a more differentiated view that acknowledges the common 
points of departure, but also pays due attention to the heterogeneity that is to be found 
in this group. I will illustrate this point by sketching the way in which Brentano’s con-
ception of philosophy as a rigorous science was received. 
2. The fascination of Brentano’s maxim concerning method
The idea that the early Brentano tried to distinguish himself from the current main-
stream by insisting on the conception of a rigorous, scientific philosophy was defi-
nitely perceived by the philosophy professors of the University of Würzburg who 
were members of the exam committee. We know from Brentano’s own testimony, 
but also from that of Carl Stumpf, that already during the Habilitations-defense, 
Brentano’s fourth thesis was harshly attacked by members of the committee, in par-
ticular by Schelling’s student Franz Hoffmann and by the philologist Carl Ludwig 
Urlichs17. When Brentano gave a lecture on Schelling in December 188918, he read 
in large parts from the manuscript that he had prepared for the lecture at the occa-
sion of his Habilitation more than 23 years earlier. In the introductory remarks, 
and M. Schättle, in mcaliSter, The Philosophy of Brentano, pp. 47-55, here p. 51) and Meinong (cf. a. 
meinong, Selbstdarstellung, in R. ScHmidt [ed.], Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, 
Meiner, leipzig 1923, pp. 100-160, here p. 104) mention that Brentano was typically not reacting well 
when one of his students turned against his own position or departed in ways that he could not approve. 
This way of reacting can be read as an expression of Brentano’s hope that his students would accept his 
general, overall framework and to work within its parameters. Contrary to Stumpf’s statement there is, 
thus, evidence, that Brentano did like the idea that there might be a Brentano school in which his approach 
is further elaborated. Husserl expressed this assessment explicitly in his Reminiscences, where he stated 
that Brentano’s «inner certainty that he was moving in the right direction and was founding a purely sci-
entific philosophy never wavered» and then continues with the following words: «This explains, first, why 
being a deeply penetrating and effective teacher, indeed, why having a school (in the good sense) was so 
important to him: not only for the dissemination of the insights achieved, but also for the continued work 
on his thoughts» (HuSSerl, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 51).
16 For an illustration of this point, a reference to the following two volumes might suffice: L. alBer-
tazzi - M. liBardi - R. poli (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1996; Kriegel, The 
Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.
17 Cf. Stumpf, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 11. Incidentally, at the occasion of the debate con-
cerning Brentano’s promotion to außerordentlicher Professor in December 1870 (cf. above, footnote 5), 
also Urlichs drafted a Separatvotum, where he expressed himself in favor of Brentano’s promotion.
18 Über Schellings Philosophie, lecture given at the Philosophische Gesellschaft on December 17, 1889. 
Brentano acknowledges that the lecture is in great parts identical to his inaugural lecture he had given at the 
occasion of his Habilitations-defense on July 14, 1866 (with the title Über Schellings Philosophie in ihren 
verschiedenen Phasen, Darstellung und Kritik). According to Carl Stumpf, it was not Brentano who chose 
to speak on this topic; probably it was set by Hoffmann, cf. Stumpf, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 11.
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he shares his recollections of the Habilitations-defense and says, with reference to 
alois Mayr and Franz hoffmann: 
Schelling’s students, thus, were my judges. And I had to be doubly careful. For my judges were 
at the same time the adverse party; and they knew me as opponent since I stepped into the field 
with an open visor. For among the 25 theses, which I had posted for public defense, one, which 
they chose to become primary target of attack, was: Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi 
scientiae naturalis est 19.
It is noteworthy that Brentano uses the metaphor of a medieval tournament to describe 
his Habilitations-defense, which is actually an exam. Moreover, Carl Stumpf uses the 
same metaphor when he describes the event in his Reminiscences20. this choice of 
wording echoes that Brentano and his closer circle recalled this event not as a cordial 
and harmonious discussion, nor as an exam in which the student tries to show that he 
has absorbed the view of his academic teachers, but rather as an intense exchange and 
confrontation in which a young and rising contestant dared to challenge the traditional 
understanding of philosophy and its method – and that he did so in a quite vehement 
or even polemic manner. 
Brentano, thus, stood up for his views and it seems that he has done so in an 
impressive manner – at least in the eyes of (parts of) the audience. We can assume 
that it were in particular the young students who cheered. Carl Stumpf, who was one 
of them at the time, writes: «the way in which Brentano defended and explained his 
theses revealed him to be so superior to his attackers that I decided then and there to 
attend his lectures in the autumn»21. Stumpf adds that it was in particular Brentano’s 
views on the method of philosophy that caught his attention:
We were especially happy that the method he claimed for philosophy was none other than that 
of the natural sciences, and that he based his hopes for a rebirth of philosophy on this method. It 
was a new, incomparably deeper and more serious way of understanding philosophy22.
Stumpf’s testimony clearly underlines the importance of Brentano’s conception of 
philosophy as a strict and rigorous science for the formation of the first group of 
students. It is remarkable, however, that this holds not only for the first – and prob-
ably most faithful – generation of students in Würzburg; we have testimonies also 
of students who attended Brentano’s lectures in Vienna, who mention Brentano’s 
conception of philosophy as a rigorous science as the element that had primarily 
19 «Schellings Schüler waren also meine Richter. Und ich mußte doppelt achtsam sein. Denn meine 
Richter waren zugleich die mir feindliche Partei; und sie kannten mich als Gegner, da ich mit offenem 
Visier in die Schranken trat. Denn unter den 25 Thesen, die ich damals zur öffentlichen Verteidigung 
anschlug, lautete eine, die sie sofort zum Ziel des Angriffs wählten: Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia 
nisi scientiae naturarum est» (Brentano, Über die Zukunft der Philosophie, pp. 106 ff., my translation). 
20 Cf. C. Stumpf, Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano, in O. KrauS (ed.), Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis 
seines Lebens und seiner Werke, Beck, München 1919, pp. 85-149, here p. 88. In the english translation, 
the German term «Turnier» is translated with «battle of wits» (id., Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 11), 
which does not conserve the metaphor and, thus, risks at not doing full justice to the spirit of the formulation. 
21 Ibidem. In this term, Brentano lectured on History of Philosophy. The course is not listed in the offi-
cial Verzeichniss der Vorlesungen of the University of Würzburg. Brentano, however, makes reference to it 
in his application to become außerordentlicher Professor, which is reprinted in Freudenberger.
22 Ibidem.
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caught their attention or deserved their admiration. Alois Höfler, for example, who 
attended Brentano’s lectures in Vienna from 1877 on, expresses in his otherwise 
quite bitter obituary his «honest and until today not diminished thankfulness for 
the fact that I have found in Brentano really the very first teacher, who taught me to 
apply in philosophical matters the same rigorous standards, as I have learnt to do it 
in mathematics and physics»23.
When Edmund Husserl attended Brentano’s lectures at the University of Vienna 
in 1884-1886, he did not see a provocative young scholar, but an arrived and charis-
matic philosopher who had many followers. Like Stumpf24, also Husserl noted that the 
encounter with Brentano had convinced him to pursue a career in philosophy25 – and 
also he mentioned Brentano’s conception of a rigorous, scientific philosophy as deci-
sive element. In his Reminiscences, he suggests that he owes to Brentano the «convic-
tion that philosophy, too, is a field of serious endeavour, and that it too can – and, in 
fact, must – be dealt with in a rigorously scientific manner»26.
These testimonies are significant, for they show two things: first, Brentano insisted 
on questions concerning the right method in philosophy in all phases of his career as 
academic teacher, both by applying a rigorous and scientific style of reasoning and by 
explicitly reflecting on questions concerning method in his lectures27. Second, Bren-
tano’s style of reasoning and his new methodological outlook fascinated students, 
awakened or reinforced their interest for philosophy and philosophical psychology, 
and significantly shaped their views. In fact, most of his students who continued to 
work in philosophy adopted central notions of Brentano’s philosophy – most impor-
tantly, the notion of intentionality – as integral, central elements of their own philo-
sophical positions and remained (by and large) faithful to Brentano’s conception of 
scientific philosophy, understood in a broad sense, even though many of them have 
found it necessary to further develop or emend it. This shows that Brentano’s views on 
method were a central element – in combination with his didactic talents – for Bren-
tano’s success among students. From a historical or sociological perspective, it defi-
nitely seems plausible to individuate in Brentano’s conception concerning the method 
of philosophy a unifying element that allowed Brentano to form a group of students 
who were willing to conduct their own research within this larger framework.
3. Seeing the differences
The discussion of the preceding sections illustrates primarily the «power that Bren-
tano exercised over susceptible students»28: he offered a new and original outlook 
23 «Die aufrichtige und bis heute nicht geschwundene Dankbarkeit dafür, daß ich ja in Brentano wirk-
lich den allerersten Lehrer gefunden hatte, der mich in philosophischen Dingen ebenso strenge Maßstäbe 
anlegen lehrte, wie ich es in Mathematik und Physik gelernt hatte» (A. Höfler, Franz Brentano in Wien, 
«Süddeutsche Monatshefte», München, May 1917, pp. 319-325, here p. 321, my translation).
24 Cf. Stumpf, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 12.
25 HuSSerl, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 48.
26 Ibidem.
27 Some of the later Vienna lectures on method have been published in Brentano, Descriptive Psy-
chology.
28 Stumpf, Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 12.
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that promised to leave behind the ‘old’ traditions of German idealism and system 
philosophy. Moreover, he drew the attention of his most talented students to ques-
tions related to the study of mind and consciousness and to the emerging discipline 
of psychology: new fields in which students felt they could conduct cutting-edge 
research and contribute in the exploration of «dark continents»29 that had not been 
explored beforehand. 
For showing that Brentano’s method could be considered a unifying element for 
the Brentano school, however, one would also have to show that it was applied, by 
the members of a school, in a (more or less) uniform way. I fear that in this respect 
we will find far less homogeneity as one could expect. In what follows I will focus 
on two reasons why the group of Brentano’s students did not form a homogeneous 
group that could perceived as such by their contemporaries: First, many of Bren-
tano’s students wanted to be perceived not as members of a bigger movement that 
had been founded by someone else, but as independent philosophers who were in a 
position to start a movement or a school in their own right. Second, while many of 
Brentano’s direct students constitute at best a heterogeneous group of philosophers, 
who developed in very different directions, the second generation of students (Bren-
tano’s so-called Enkelschüler) appropriated Brentano’s philosophy and established 
a new orthodoxy that made it even more difficult for less devoted students to offi-
cially adhere to the ‘true doctrine’. 
3.1. Brentano’s independent students
It is often reported that Brentano tried to teach his students to become independent 
thinkers on their own and, in fact, it seems that he was more successful in this point 
than he wanted to be. In fact, many of his students have proven to have an open eye for 
the theoretical problems in the discipline and the capacity to develop the theoretical 
framework to address these problems.
Many of Brentano’s students built on his seminal distinction between descriptive 
and genetic psychology; some of them, in particular Carl Stumpf and Alexius Mei-
nong, tried to develop both strands and put a strong emphasis on laboratory research. 
Meinong, as is well known, inaugurated the first psychological laboratory in the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Empire, Carl Stumpf established a psychological laboratory at the 
University of Berlin. these achievements were essential in the development of the 
emergence of a scientific psychology. In this scientific context, however, where exper-
imental results are typically more important than individual thinkers or schools of 
29 I borrow this metaphor from Husserl who reflects, in September 1905 on the analogies and differences 
between his own position and that of Meinong and describes them as «two travelers on one and the same dark 
continent. Of course we often see the same and describe it, but [...] often in different ways [zwei Reisende 
in einem und demselben dunklen Weltteil. Natürlich sehen wir oft dasselbe und beschreiben es, aber [...] 
vielfach verschieden]» (e. HuSSerl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07, 
Husserliana XXIV, hrsg. von U. Melle, Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1984, p. 444, my translation). It is remarkable that 
we find similar metaphors regularly among Brentano’s students, which shows that the idea of discovering 
and exploring new areas of knowledge was widespread among them. In his biography of Brentano, Kastil, 
for example, describes Brentano as a philosopher who was interested in «penetrating hitherto unexplored dis-
tricts of truth [das Vordringen in noch uneroberte Bezirke der Wahrheit]» (a. KaStil, Die Philosophie Franz 
Brentanos. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre, Francke, Bern 1951, p. 7, my translation).
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thought, they were more likely to be perceived as empirically working scholars, and 
not as philosophers who were part of the Brentano school. Thus, the foundation of 
psychological laboratories, that was so much demanded by Brentano, overshadowed 
the particularly Brentanian heritage of Stumpf’s and Meinong’s achievements in the 
context of scientific psychology. 
Things might have gone in a different manner if Brentano would have succeeded 
in opening and guiding his own research laboratory; in this case, a Brentanian school 
of scientific psychology might have become a leading movement that could have 
considerably shaped the emergence of the discipline. As Brentano lost his academic 
influence after his resignation from the position as full professor at the University of 
Vienna30, however, he no longer had the academic power to realize such a project. 
Also within the narrower field of philosophy, where Brentano’s contributions were 
undisputed, many of his students stood up for their independence from their teacher, 
though. Both Meinong and Husserl, for example, developed philosophical positions 
that clearly show Brentanian roots, but go in essential respects beyond – and both did 
so with the recognizable intention to form a movement or school in their own right, 
the theory of objects and phenomenology, respectively. 
There were definitely several reasons why Meinong and Husserl have broken with 
Brentano; some of them had a more personal nature31, others were related to the psy-
chologistic tendencies in Brentano’s philosophy, others again to the latter’s restrictive 
views in metaphysics: After Twardowski’s critique of Brentano’s early conception of 
intentionality32 both Meinong and Husserl opened up their metaphysical horizons, 
while Brentano reacted with a radicalization of his metaphysical views in his turn 
towards reism33. One additional motive for deviating from Brentano’s position, which 
is more central to the discussion of this paper, is related to methodological questions. 
30 Brentano, as is well known, resigned from his position in 1880 when he decided to get married with 
Ida von Lieben. As the Austrian laws did not permit a wedding for former priests, Brentano had to resign 
from his Austrian citizenship – and his position as a full professor – to become Sassonian citizen and get 
married in Leipzig. Brentano thought that it would only be a short-term resignation and that he could 
come back into his position after his wedding. The Austrian ministry, however, did not play along and 
Brentano could continue teaching at the University of Vienna only as Privatdozent. this loss of academic 
power might have prevented the formation of a strong Brentano school at Vienna. Moreover, the events 
described might also have reinforced Brentano’s notorious reluctance to publish, which might have been 
a further element to undermine the formation of a school. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect, cf. 
J.M. Werle, Franz Brentano und die Zukunft der Philosophie: Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte und 
Wissenschaftssystematik im 19. Jahrhundert, Rodopi, amsterdam - atlanta (ga) 1989. 
31 As I have mentioned above (cf. footnote 15), both Meinong and Husserl expressed their disappoint-
ment about Brentano’s harsh reactions when his former students developed view he could not share.
32 Cf. K. tWardoWSKi, On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation, 
Engl. transl. by R. Grossmann, Nijhoff, The Hauge 1977.
33 In a letter to Marvin Farber, Husserl comments: «In his beginnings he seemed to strive beyond 
neo-scholastics; but unfortunately he got stuck in scholastics. And it is even worse in his late writings. 
this is destilled scholastics [In seinen Anfängen schien er über die Neu-Scholastik hinauszustreben; aber 
er ist leider in Scholastik stecken geblieben. Und am Schlimmsten steht es mit seinen Altersschriften. Das 
ist destillirte Scholastik]» (e. HuSSerl, Briefwechsel, Bd. IV, Die Freiburger Schüler, hrsg. von E. Schuh-
mann and K. Schuhmann, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1994, p. 82.
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This becomes particularly manifest in the case of Husserl. Like Brentano, Husserl 
often insists that philosophy should be considered a rigorous science34, but his concep-
tion of scientific philosophy deviates considerably from Brentano’s. While the latter 
argues for a continuity of method between philosophy and the natural sciences, Hus-
serl advocates a hierarchical understanding, where philosophy prepares the ground 
for the natural sciences. Moreover, while Brentano argues that philosophy is based on 
inner perception, Husserl suggest that the relevant data for philosophy can be gathered 
only by a special procedure, the intuition of essences, which requires a special form 
of attention. In short, Husserl might have been fascinated by Brentano’s conception of 
method in his early days as a student, but he radically broke with it when he came to 
elaborate his own philosophical position. Even in his late works, Husserl came back 
to praise Brentano’s methodological approach, but when he does so he typically also 
points at its limitations. In Crisis, for example, he writes: 
Only when Brentano made the demand for psychology as a science of intentional experience 
was an impulse given that could lead further, although Brentano himself had not yet overcome 
objectivism and psychological naturalism35.
Husserl, thus, continues to express admiration for Brentano’s methodological con-
ception and to praise it for its innovative power, but uses all occasions to criticize the 
naturalistic and sensualistic roots in Brentano’s conception which he thinks to have 
overcome with his phenomenological method. 
this shows that Brentano’s conception of the method of philosophy had the poten-
tial to attract young and talented students, but it did not prevent them from deviating 
from Brentano’s position once they had individuated the aspects in which they took 
the approach to be insufficient. In the light of this discussion it might be surprising 
that in a recent contribution, which I think is very interesting, Arnauld Dewalque has 
individuated Brentano’s method and his metaphysical views as the unifying element 
of the Brentano school in the sense that they are shared by all and only the members 
of the Brentano school36. Dewalque lists a set of nine propositions that he takes to be 
distinctive of Brentanianism; they are, in other words, necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for membership of the Brentano school. It seems to me that the sufficiency 
claim can be criticized for being overstated, for it does not take the historical and geo-
graphical unity of the school into consideration. The claim concerning necessity, on 
the other hand, is too strong, for it considerably restricts the Brentano school. It seems 
to me, for example, that neither Husserl nor Meinong would have accepted the second 
set of propositions that concern the relation between philosophy and psychology and 
consists in the following claims: 
34 Cf., for example, id., Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, «logos», 1.3 (1911), pp. 289-341.
35 id., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phe-
nomenological Philosophy, Engl. transl. by D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, p. 
298. For similar remarks, cf. ibi, pp. 222 ff., 233 ff., but also the letter to Landgrebe from February 5, 
1922, reprinted in id., Briefwechsel, Bd. IV: Die Freiburger Schüler, pp. 304 ff.
36 Cf. a. deWalque, The Unity of the Brentano School, in Kriegel, The Routledge Handbook of Franz 
Brentano and the Brentano School, pp. 236-248.
wolfgang huemer908
C4 Philosophical sciences cannot achieve their goal without relying upon investigations into 
mental phenomena. 
C5 [The reason it is so is that] philosophy uses empirical concepts, which have their source in 
inner perception. 
C6 [Therefore] philosophy must rely upon psychology37.
These propositions, and in particular C5 and C6, are at odds with Husserl’s critique 
of psychologism, his critique of inner perception, and his views on eidetic intuition. 
For this reason, I would like to suggest that the nine propositions that are listed by 
Dewalque should not be read as necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but rather 
as prototypical theses that allow us to detect a family resemblance among members 
of the school. This would allow us to continue to speak of the Brentano school in a 
looser sense that refers to a group of philosophers who worked in a given historical 
and geographic context on similar problems, applying or developing similar methods. 
It would require us to give up the idea that there is a clearly circumscribed school or 
that we could determine whether someone was a member of the school on the basis 
of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, though. The nine propositions listed 
by Dewalque could still function as a useful touchstone that can help to individuate 
deviations of individual students who took distance of the school, but continued to 
acknowledge the influence that Brentano had exerted on them. 
3.2. The role of orthodox Brentanianism
It is, I think, a merit of Dewalque’s proposal that it tries to give a sort of rational 
reconstruction of what it might have meant to be a member of the Brentano school. 
In a project of this kind, which deals with a sort of idealization, it is possible, if not 
desired, to leave out historical or geographical details that are not pertinent for these 
narrow purposes. If we aim to get an understanding of the historical reality of a Bren-
tano school, on the other hand, we cannot leave out aspects that were less rational, 
but might nonetheless have been decisive for the course of the events. In this perspec-
tive, one would have to take aspects like rivalry, personal antagonisms, or inappropri-
ate appropriations into account. The short, but little friendly letter exchange between 
Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, for example, might give an idea why the two 
did not make a joint attempt to reform and further develop Brentano’s methodological 
approach38. A thorough examination of all relevant factors of this kind, which span 
over a finely woven web of personal relations of a large number of persons, goes, of 
course, far beyond the scope of this paper. For this reason, I would like to focus only 
on one contingent factor, which, I think, ironically was a great obstacle for the forma-
tion of a Brentano school in a larger sense: the attempts of Brentano’s second gener-
ation students (Enkelschüler) in Prague, Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil, to promote a 
Brentano school (in a more restricted sense). the two have gotten to know Brentano 
only in his late years, when he did not hold any university position any longer and was 
37 Ibi, p. 246.
38 For a more detailed discussion, cf. W. Huemer, Husserl’s Critique of Psychologism and his Relation 
to the Brentano School, in a. cHrudzimSKi - W. Huemer (eds.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on 
Central-European Philosophy, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, pp. 199-215.
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weakened by his blindness and took, in consequence Brentano’s late position, espe-
cially his reism, as the most authentic of his views. 
I have mentioned above that according to Stumpf, Brentano never had the inten-
tion to form a school, while Husserl stated that it would have been important for 
Brentano to have a school «in the good sense»39. Husserl’s remark shows that the 
term «school» was not always used with positive connotations at the time, for they 
can easily become dogmatic and, thus, unscientific. It seems to me that the efforts 
of the «Brentanoten» (as they were called in Prague) Kraus and Kastil were often 
perceived in this way by some of Brentano’s direct students, as they seemed to have 
had very clear ideas about the ‘true doctrine’ and were quick to criticize others for 
deviating from original Brentano’s position. This attitude might have awakened 
the urge in many «Brentanians» (in a large sense) to distance themselves from the 
«Brentano school». In fact, also Arnauld Dewalque acknowledges that the term 
«Brentano school» was used among Brentano’s students also to «distance them-
selves from what they take to be sheer Brentanian orthodoxy»40.
When asked by Marvin Farber for his relation to Oskar Kraus, for example, 
Husserl not only expresses his bewilderment about the conduct of the «Brentano 
school», he also takes the occasion to distance himself from Brentano.
Kraus […] is basically a good guy, but as Brentanist he is a real fanatic, a kind of Torquemada. 
He would not hesitate, if he had the power, to burn Brentano’s enemies at the stake. Including 
me and my friends, for I began in my youth as an enthusiastic admirer of Brentano and took 
myself for too long a time, in a self-delusion, which now is difficult to understand, to be a col-
laborator of his philosophy and in particular his psychology41.
For sure, Husserl had taken distances from Brentano already beforehand, but I find it 
telling that in this letter he finds strong words of regret for his former enthusiasm for 
Brentano when answering a question concerning Oskar Kraus. 
Similarly, also Meinong insists in a letter to twardowski in his independence 
from Brentano and complains that this independence was not seen from philoso-
phers of outside the school, but that he was criticized for it from within. Meinong 
writes: «the less informed interpret my relation to Brentano very much to the dis-
advantage of my independence, while it is my very independence that is so often 
criticized by the “orthodox”»42.
39 Cf. above, note 15.
40 a. deWalque, The Rise of the Brentano School, in Kriegel, The Routledge Handbook of Franz Bren-
tano and the Brentano School, pp. 225-235, here p. 225.
41 «Kraus [… ] ist eigentlich ein „guter Kerl“, aber als Brentanist ein arger Fanatiker, eine Art Torque-
mada. Er würde die Gegner Brentano’s ohne eine Miene zu verziehen, wenn er die Macht hätte, auf Schei-
terhaufen verbrennen. Darunter mich u. meine Freunde, denn ich fieng zwar in der Jugend als begeisterter 
Verehrer Br<entano>s an u. hielt mich, allzulange, in einer jetzt schwer verständlichen Selbsttäuschung, 
für einen Mitarbeiter an seiner Philosophie, u. insbesondere seiner Psychologie» (HuSSerl, Briefwechsel, 
Bd. IV, Die Freiburger Schüler, p. 82, my translation).
42 «Minder Orientierte mein Verhältnis zu Brentano sehr zum Schaden meiner Selbständigkeit zurecht 
legen, indes es doch gerade diese Selbständigkeit ist, die mir die „Rechtgläubigen“ so sehr zum Vorwurfe 
machen» (Meinong’s letter from July 2, 1897, reprinted in A. meinong - K. tWardoWSKi, Der Briefwechsel, 
ed. by V. Raspa, De Gruyter, Boston 2016, p. 82, my translation). Meinong refers to a passage in Friedrich 
Ueberwegs Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, where he is characterized as an admirer of Brentano. 
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This statement illustrates very well the tension in which the more independent stu-
dents of Brentano have found themselves: From the outside they were often perceived 
as students of Brentano, while orthodox Brentanists treated them as traitors of the true 
doctrine. It is obvious that they must have felt uncomfortable in both roles, for both 
Husserl and Meinong saw themselves as independent philosophers, or even as found-
ers of philosophical schools in their own right, who have had a great debt to Brentano, 
but always strived for developing a position of their own.
4. Conclusion
The discussion so far illustrates well, I think, that the term «Brentano school» is most 
useful when it is used not in a narrow or restrictive, but in a loose way that includes 
all those philosophers who have had direct or indirect contact with Brentano and have 
been influenced by his position – even if they later might have felt it necessary to 
emend or modify parts of the doctrine. Brentano was often described as a charismatic 
teacher; he impressed a large number of students with his views about the nature of 
philosophy, its method, and its content, in particular the emerging discipline of psy-
chology. Moreover, he invited his students to become independent thinkers in their 
own right and to conduct their own research in ways that are appropriate to the phe-
nomena. The fact that Brentano (or, for that reasons, the orthodox Brentanists) could 
not approve of many of the individual achievements of his former students, should not 
make us overlook that Brentano exerted an impact on the development of philosophy 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century mainly through his former students, 
especially the more independent ones. This fact that could easily be overlooked if we 
apply a too narrow conception of the «Brentano school» or make adherence to the 
school dependent on criteria that are overly restrictive.
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